George Washington: Military Genius (The Generals) - Softcover

Too many Americans including scholars downplay Washington’s military leadership, implying he was just the right man at the right place. General Palmer demonstrates once and for all that Washington had a strategy to win the war, and the determination to survive against all odds.”
James C. Rees, president of the Mount Vernon Ladies’ Association

Palmer makes a convincing case that America is free, united, and governed by civilians because of Washington’s strategic foresight and tactical brilliance.”
Publishers Weekly

Dave Palmer rightly portrays General George Washington as a shrewd and effective commander in chief who understood better than anyone American or British the connection between political goals and military operations during the American Revolutionary War. Palmer’s superb history is clearheaded and insightful anyone interested in the art of war at the strategic level will find this thoughtful book indispensable.”
Colonel Lance Betros, head of the Department of History, West Point

Many military historians dismiss George Washington as merely lucky: he won the Revolutionary War by sheer dogged persistence against a half-hearted British enemy that decided the prize wasn’t worth the cost. But this, says Lieutenant General Dave R. Palmer a combat veteran, former superintendent of West Point, and expert military historian is simply wrong. Washington’s strategy was suited to his aim and changed with the circumstances of the war but through it all he practiced the way of the fox. In George Washington’s Military Genius, Lieutenant General Palmer reveals:

• What guided Washington’s boldness in the first year of the war
  
• How Washington held his army together and built it up with little or no money and, in the beginning, no allies
  
• How Washington used European professionals to train his soldiers and capitalized on the results
  
• Washington’s keen appreciation for French naval power
  
• The secret of Washington’s unparalleled moral leadership, without which the war might not have been won